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ABSTRACT
During the presidential campaign of 2016, Donald Trump
successfully marshaled years of repressed popular anger over job
losses and the erosion of the middle class, caused in part by a
globalizing economy and the movement of the American
manufacturing base to other parts of the world. Although a
great deal of job loss in the American “heartland” was caused by
automation, there is little doubt that many factories were closed
and moved abroad with no regard for the devastated middleclass workers left behind. This outsourcing of the American
workforce was the result of free trade laws devised in the 1990s,
resistance to which mainstream politicians and scholars had
largely failed to take seriously. Trump articulated and
channeled this populist anger, while ignoring the opportunistic
role played by American corporations in taking advantage of free
trade rules to move their operations abroad in pursuit of greater
profitability. Trump also distorted public understanding of the
problem by emphasizing the idea that other countries had
“taken advantage of” and “ripped off” the United States. In this,
he relied on an untapped well of resentment among American
workers, seducing voters with the promise that he could
renegotiate these deals and restore a lost economic world in
which they had felt more secure.
This article argues that global free trade and the laws that
support it have complex purposes, and mixed economic effects.
While job losses have occurred, globalization has also brought
about benefits in terms of peace and international
understanding. This article also explores the important legal
question of whether and how one president is capable of
bringing down the entire world trading system, built up over
several decades. In addition, the reasons behind the obvious
failure of trade law specialists to confront the contradictions
posed by free trade doctrine, and the extent to which they failed
to prescribe remedies for its adverse fallout are also analyzed in
depth. Finally, this article suggests possible remedies to protect
American workers against the ill effects of labor outsourcing, but
notes that few if any American politicians have seriously
pursued such remedies, for instance by drafting statutes to that
end. Empowering workers in corporate decision making and
imposing serious penalties on corporations when jobs are lost
through outsourcing are methods that have scarcely been tried.
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INTRODUCTION

The 2016 presidential campaign in the United States
upended decades of mainstream rhetoric on the subject of free
trade and international trade agreements. Long regarded as
both inevitable and benign by most scholars and commentators,
the Trump campaign came out swinging against what it called
“bad trade deals,” and threatened to pull the United States out
of major trade commitments made over the past fifty years. This
Article presents the view that Trump was able to capitalize on
scholarly and political neglect of the issue of free trade and job
loss over many years, while claiming to be the savior of the
American worker from the ravages of the free trade consensus.
There has long been valid concern over the implications for labor
rights in the United States and elsewhere, as free trade
agreements inevitably pitted American workers against much
lower cost workers in countries such as China, a competition
made possible by the fact that goods that can flow freely around
the world can also be manufactured virtually anywhere as well.
This Article explores the manner in which Trump seized
upon a neglected issue—the quiet rage of workers in the
American heartland because of factory closures over many
years—and manipulatively turned this into a problem of “bad
deals for America” with foreign governments. In his
presentation, bad foreign actors were the problem, and he alone
would know how to confront these wily governments. As the
Article explains, the major free trade agreements of our day are
based on a set of broad principles believed to lead to peace and
prosperity through economic integration. While free trade has
undoubtedly not led to prosperity for all, it is certainly the case
that global peace and stability rely in part on the predictability
global trade law helps to create.
The Article explores the manner in which Trump provided
a false analysis to a real problem, and it suggests the kind of
labor-protective solution that could preserve our post-World War
II ethos of free and fair trade, while responding to the legitimate
pain and anger at trade-induced job loss and inequality. This
Article also analyzes what one President has the power to do in
terms of removing the United States from the world trading
order, and where those powers must give way to Congress. The
Article provides useful perspective as stakeholders in the United
States grapple with the implications of Trump’s threats against
a free trade system that, while problematic from the point of
view of many workers, can only be torn down at the cost of much
chaos and upheaval worldwide.
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Section I of this Article looks at the manner in which
Trump framed the free trade problem for American voters, and
it compares this to how global trade rules really operate. Section
II explores the increasingly strident role of populists on the
world stage, and how their promises, if able to be tested, are
unlikely to prove effective against the problems of
unemployment, underemployment and social dislocation.
Section III describes the author’s long-standing sense that
experts in the trade law field were ignoring the job loss and
dislocation phenomena at the nation’s peril, and it explores how
the newly enforceable trade laws of the 1990s guaranteed a
backlash against the effects of those laws over time. Section IV
explains advice the author tried to convey to the Clinton
campaign, to encourage them to seize and repackage the trade
and job loss issue. The section suggests statutory remedies for
the outsourcing problem that would be far more effective than
anything advocated by Trump, either before or after the election.
Section V looks more broadly at the theoretical basis for free
trade, and how this theoretical justification tends to break down
in the practical economic realm. The argument is presented
that, despite flaws in economic effects, the trade regime ushered
in by the World Trade Organization in 1995 is an important
pillar of world stability and a model for enforceable
international law. Section VI goes on to inquire into what trade
laws Trump could actually destroy, and to what extent he is
willing or capable of pulling down a trade regime that has been
decades in the making. It may be, as this Article points out, that
his ambitions will prove far more modest than his rhetoric on
the campaign trail. In this regard, the final section, Section VII,
explores what Trump is specifically proposing to date in terms of
alteration to existing free trade agreements.
II.

INTRODUCTION: COULD ONE PRESIDENT ACTUALLY
OVERTURN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM?
As of this writing, Donald Trump has revived the one
issue that worked best for him during the long campaign of
2015-2016: “fixing” America’s trade deals. 1 This inartfully
expressed ambition seemed to go quiet to some extent after the
See Chris Riotta, Trump Warns of Ending Global Trade Deals Minutes
Before Taking Off for Second World Trip, NEWSWEEK (July 5, 2017, 9:55 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-tweets-world-trade-deals-g20summit-germany-what-will-happen-632000 (noting that Trump tweeted “The
United States made some of the worst Trade Deals in world history. Why
should we continue these deals with countries that do not help us?”).
1
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election, but he has reprised the anti-trade rhetoric in recent
months, renewing calls to get out of “disastrous” trade deals that
have supposedly allowed the US to be taken advantage of by
“countries that do not help us,” whatever that might mean at
any given time.2
Of course, the post-World War II trading system is based
on regional and global trade agreements in addition to
particular and specific bilateral ones, but the broad outlines of
international trade are based on common and well-established
global rules. 3 Global trade agreements operate more like a
general playbook than detailed contracts; they represent
voluntarily accepted commitments on the part of participating
countries (which is more or less everyone) and are meant to
achieve a certain vision of the world as integrated, with a
complex, interconnected set of economic benefits and, in one
sense, mutual dependencies.4 Specific issues are often dealt with
under the negotiating umbrellas provided by these larger
agreements, but the agreements themselves cannot accurately
be described as “deals” in the true sense. The goals of modern
trade agreements are consciously both economic and political.5
As will be discussed below, the then new and more
comprehensive (as well as enforceable) trade agreements of the
1990s had dramatic effects within wealthy, developed countries,
and in newly industrialized countries.6 It is fairly obvious that
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jul. 5, 2017, 4:14 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/882558219285131265?lang=en; see also
Vicki Needham, Trump Says He Will Renegotiate or Withdraw From NAFTA,
THE HILL (June 28, 2016, 2:53 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/285189trump-says-he-will-renegotiate-or-withdraw-from-nafta-without-changes
(describing Trump’s declaration that NAFTA has been disastrous for America
and that he would promptly fix it or leave it if elected president);.
3 See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 421, 425-35 (1998) (setting out the basic structures of the multilateral
GATT system, which developed into the WTO). While all multilateral and
regional trade agreements have country-specific and bilateral aspects, the
animating concept is found in a set of common principles and goals.
4 See Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT’L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209, 213-40 (2011)
(describing the development of international trade law from a narrower
concern with tariff reduction through to a far broader role in global
governance).
5 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 544-49 (2000) (setting out a grand theory of how the
WTO’s goals can be seen as transcendently “constitutional”).
6 See Lori Wallach, Questions the Democratic Presidential Candidates Need to
Answer on Trade & Globalization, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/questions-the-democratic2
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with greater mobility of manufacturing, large corporations
would follow cheap labor in the knowledge that the goods
produced could flow freely and without impediment. 7 The
American worker, qua American worker, became less valuable
under such a scenario. This is not a polemical statement, but
rather a logical fact. The more choices corporations have in
terms of global labor pools, the less any one such pool of workers
can demand of corporations.8
To an extraordinary degree, mainstream American
politics ignored this reality, and ignored the anger and
resentment of those whose communities, identities and ways of
life were subverted by global economic changes.9 While displaced
workers could be told that they would ultimately have better
jobs and higher skills as a result of free trade, or that they were
being displaced by automation every bit as much as by
globalization, the subterranean unhappiness at this state of
affairs created the potential for explosive political capture.10 At
least part of the Trump phenomenon was directly linked to this
overlooked reality.11

_b_88040.html (last updated May 25, 2011), (stating that Democratic
presidential candidates should address the problem of how trade agreements
incentivize the offshoring of American jobs).
7 See generally JEFF FAUX, THE GLOBAL CLASS WAR:
HOW AMERICA’S
BIPARTISAN ELITE LOST OUR FUTURE- AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN IT
BACK 59 (2006) (explaining NAFTA created to give corporate investors access
to cheap labor in Mexico).
8 See Katherine Peralta, Outsourcing to China Cost U.S. 3.2 Million Jobs
Since
2001,
US
NEWS
(Dec.
11,
2014,
4:57
PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/12/11/outsourcing-tochina-cost-us-32-million-jobs-since-2001 (noting that recent research supports
the perception that wage competition and other “bottom line” issues caused
US manufacturers to move to China in large numbers from the time of
China’s accession to the WTO).
9 See Tom Hamburger, Carol D. Leonnig & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama’s
Record on Outsourcing Draws Criticism From the Left, WASH. POST (July 9,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obamas-record-onoutsourcing-draws-criticism-from-theleft/2012/07/09/gJQAljJCZW_story.html?utm_term=.b97f2a4fa260
(noting
that President Obama was widely perceived not to have lived up to promises
that he would stem the flow of jobs out of the United States).
10 See Pankaj Ghemawat, People Are Angry About Globalization. Here’s What
to Do About It, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/peopleare-angry-about-globalization-heres-what-to-do-about-it (arguing for higher
levels of information being presented to the general public on this topic).
11 See Beverly Gage, Who Is the Forgotten Man?, N.Y. TIMES:
WHAT
HAPPENED
ON
ELECTION
DAY
(Nov.
9,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016
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The Trump campaign’s best and most attention-getting
issue was the anti-free trade position taken by the candidate.
This was successful because Trump seemed to be saying what
almost no one else across the political spectrum would say: That
free trade had harmed large swaths of American workers in a
profound way, and that free trade rules needed to be changed.
(Bernie Sanders, of course, also made a similar argument with
substantial success.)
The subject of this article, though, is the manner in which
Trump employed his anti-trade-deal argument in a twisted
manner, making it seem as if other countries had tricked and
out-negotiated the United States—whereas the real story is twofold: The way large US corporations betrayed American workers
through outsourcing production to locations abroad; and the fact
that no US labor or tax laws protected American workers
against this phenomenon. Trump used the understandable
resentment and mistrust of US workers in affected areas, but
turned it to his special advantage by aiming his wrath at foreign
governments. 12 He also ignored the central role of US
corporations, who relentlessly used the free trade agreements of
the 1990s to search the world for cheaper and less regulated
jurisdictions in which to make their products, while still
maintaining full access to the American consumer market.
Thus, Trump was able to take advantage of untapped
rage and confusion (how could our government let this happen to
our way of life and former prosperity?), while shielding from
blame the corporate class of which he is himself a charter
member. It was also easier and more convenient to blame
foreign “deal makers,” setting himself up as the only possible
savior, a perception assisted by his tabloid reputation as a
supposed deal maker extraordinaire.13

(attributing Trump’s victory to his advocacy on behalf of the “forgotten”
working-class white man).
12 These foreign governments are supposedly better able to make good “deals”
on behalf of their people.
13 See Heather Digby Parton, Donald Trump’s Myth is Coming Unglued,
SALON (June 29, 2017), http://www.salon.com/2017/06/29/donald-trumpsmyth-is-coming-unglued-how-did-the-supposed-master-dealmaker-become-aspectacularly-incompetent-president/ (observing distinction between Trump’s
media persona and his effectiveness as a president); Chris Cillizza, Donald
Trump Played a Game of Chicken with House Republicans, WASH. POST (Mar.
24,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/03/24/donald-trump-played-a-game-of-chicken-with-houserepublicans-then-he-blinked/?utm_term=.c34c11f1a63b (reporting on failure
of Congress to pass healthcare reform bill, even though Trump campaigned
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While acknowledging the depth of worker resentment
over this state of affairs, and noting my former attempts to point
out this unaddressed problem, there is danger in the Trump
approach that shifts blame where it does not belong, and
threatens to undermine the political dimension of global free
trade, which is of course international peace and cooperation. At
a more practical level, it is completely undetermined at the time
of this writing how far Trump will try to go in fulfilling his
campaign’s trade-related promises, and what he could actually
accomplish if he decided to carry through on these. 14 What
follows is both an explanation, as well as some speculation, on
where we are and where we are likely to go, legally and
politically, on the fraught subject of global free trade agreements
and their effects within the United Sates.
III.

FALSE SAVIORS: TRADE, JOB LOSS AND NEO-POPULISTS

Conventional wisdom is that “populism” is on the rise
worldwide. While rarely explained adequately, the term refers to
a political technique that relies on stirring up popular feelings of
nationalism, cultural self-regard and resentment against
indifferent “elites” or other outsiders. 15 Generally speaking, a
populist will celebrate the “common man” and assure him that,
though others have ignored his needs, the populist leader will
protect the interests of the “real” people.16 The populist tends to

as a “dealmaker extraordinaire” that could solve the county’s major
problems).
14 See Michael Birnbaum & Damian Paletta, At G-20, World Aligns Against
Trump
Policies,
WASH.
POST
(July
7,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/at-g-20-eu-warns-of-trade-war-iftrump-imposes-restrictions-on-steel/2017/07/07/0ffae390-62f4-11e7-a6c7f769fa1d5691_story.html?utm_term=.e35111ff525b (reporting Trump has
revived a threat to place high tariffs on foreign steel). EU leaders attending
the G20 summit in Germany in July 2017 stated that there would be clear
and immediate retaliation if Trump imposes new restrictions on steel
imports. See id.
15 See The Economist Explains: What Is Populism?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 19,
2016),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2016/12/economist-explains-18 (explaining that populism can take
many ideological forms, and citing to the theory that “populists are defined by
their claim that they alone represent the people, and that all others are
illegitimate.”).
16 See Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist? And Is Donald Trump One,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populisttrump/516525/ (noting that populists divide society into two camps: the
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traffic in the more emotional side of politics, leaving the
measured logic of the Enlightenment to others. 17 Grand
promises are made by populists, the people are told that their
time is now, and that everything that has befallen them is
someone else’s fault—and that that group of “others” will
henceforth be identified as the common enemy of both the people
and the populist. 18 To make sure that logic and facts do not
undermine this vision, the media is thrown in as an enemy of
the people as well.
However widely used in recent times, the term “populism”
does not fully capture the salient themes and techniques of
contemporary global politics. One unmistakable trend has been
for far-right political figures to seize on international trade
agreements as contrary to the interests of the traditional
working class, on the grounds that bad “deals” rob these people
of job security and a reliable economic role in the life of the
nation. 19 Both Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen have taken
this line of attack in recent months. Under this theory, the
“global elites” have gone about the business of betrayal, working
in concert to profiteer from the misery of the honest working
men and women, plotting in the shadows to rob them of their
economic and social birthright. This political trend has taken
different forms in different parts of the world, but in each case,
the message is one of nostalgia for an older, more localized
economy, for an order that was smashed apart by the wiles and
guiles of “free trade.”20
genuine “people” and all the others, with the populist’s role to divide people
into these two groups).
17 See J. Eric Oliver & Wendy M. Rahn, Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism
in the 2016 Election, 667 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 189, 189-91
(Sept. 2016) (noting that “populists often employ a distinctive style, one that
is simple, direct, emotional and frequently indelicate.”).
18 See Michael Ure, Trump’s Gothic Populism, Comparing Trump’s
Inauguration Speech to Obama’s, PUB. SEMINAR, (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/02/trumps-gothicpopulism/#.WVUSx4TyuUk (explaining how the Obama inauguration speech
was based squarely on the Enlightenment and Republican ideals of the 18 th
century United States; as compared with Trump’s dark and anti-democratic
vision, according to which he would be “the voice” of a people under imminent
threat).
19 See Shawn Donnan, Free Trade v Populism:
The Fight for America’s
Economy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9f5588747fe2-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4 (describing the arguments being made by antitrade, anti-globalist politicians).
20 The recent election in France featured a large dose of economic and
cultural nostalgia. See France Election: Far-right’s Le Pen Rails Against
Globalisation, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
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There is more than a little truth in the idea that global
forces have been indifferent to the severe economic dislocation
felt by the working classes in many countries, especially those
clustered in the manufacturing heartlands.21 However, the neopopulist purveyors of this theory have not, whether intentionally
or not, correctly presented the main players behind this
economic betrayal. Today’s populists have mainly pointed to
immigrants and foreigners as the culprits and targets of their
ire. In addition, foreign governments have been portrayed as
coldly determined to undermine the well-being of the virtuous
“folk” in the heartland of the populist’s nation. The populist is
able to rely on such arguments because over the past several
decades the increasingly apparent consequences of free trade
were never explained to “the people”—certainly not by the
specialists in the best position to do so over since the 1990s.
It is, as mentioned above, of crucial importance to
understand that it was large corporations that took advantage of
enhanced “free trade in goods” rules to move abroad in search of
cheap labor and other cost savings.22 The kind of relentless free
trade that was pushed by politicians of all stripes from the late
1980s onward was primarily about mobility of manufacturing. It
had little if anything to do with the 18th century doctrine of
“comparative advantage”, whereby each country should produce
that which it could make most efficiently and well, in order to
market that product to the rest of the world.23 Second, instead
europe-38872335 (describing Le Pen’s interpretation of globalization as
“manufacturing by slaves for selling to the unemployed,” and offering a
solution that is “guided by intelligent protectionism and economic
patriotism.”).
21 Many commentators over the past 20-30 years have described in detail the
way global economic elites have captured the rhetoric of free trade in order to
enrich themselves to the detriment of the middle classes. See FAUX, supra
note 7 (providing a ten-year retrospective analysis on NAFTA). A classic work
of this kind, Faux explains that “NAFTA, the prototype international
agreement for the dismantling of public regulation over business, was not
thrust upon the governing class of the United States, Mexico or Canada. It
was created by them.” See id. at 31.
22 See generally FAUX, supra note 7.
23 See Sara Dillon, Opportunism and Trade Law Revisited: The PseudoConstitution of the WTO, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1005, 1024-29 (2013) [hereinafter
Opportunism Revisited] (criticizing the doctrine of comparative advantage,
and its inadequacy to confront the problem of mass outsourcing). Previously,
I argued that for modern trade agreements, “the intellectual basis for the
trade rules in a ‘comparative advantage’ doctrine was flimsy, the likely
outcome for certain labor interests plain to see, and yet what was glaringly
important …was completely ignored by most ‘specialists’ in the field.” Id. at
1010.
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of calling for increased worker rights and demanding effective
incentives for US and European manufacturers to remain in
their home countries, neo-populists are instead using this crisis
of confidence to peddle policies that will likely render the lives of
the affected workers even more disadvantaged.24 In that sense,
cynical populism or ironic populism is characteristic of our age;
genuine and progressive populism is not.25
Despite official attempts to link free trade and general
prosperity, at least since the mid-1990s free trade came to be
associated in the public mind with job losses, and those pushing
the free trade agenda paid little attention to these objections.26
Despite the proliferation of law review articles on such “trade
and” topics as trade and labor, trade and the environment, trade
and national regulations, few academic specialists appeared
daunted by the prospect of a sea change in the lives of millions
of working people in the industrial zones of the United States
and other advanced economies. 27 That manufacturers were
See Jeet Heer, Trump’s Populism Is A Sham, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://newrepublic.com/article/139239/trumps-populism-sham
(expressing
strong doubts that Trump’s stated policies on outsourcing will lead to any
results protective of workers).
25 See Conor Lynch, There’s A Fake Populist in the White House—and Real
Populism Is the Only Force That Can Defeat Him, SALON (Feb. 4, 2017),
http://www.salon.com/2017/02/04/theres-a-fake-populist-in-the-white-houseand-real-populism-is-the-only-force-that-can-defeat-him/ (arguing that Trump
has misinterpreted public opinion, which favors pro-worker policies, and does
not support Trump’s reactionary agenda).
26 While most mainstream economists shared in the “free trade consensus,”
certain did offer honest, well documented analyses demonstrating that a
great deal of job loss in the US could be linked to free trade, particularly in
the past 15-20 years. See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson,
The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in
the United States, AM. ECON. REV., Oct. 2013, at 2121 (noting the dramatic
effect on US employment levels of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001); see
also Peter Dizikes, The Trade-Offs of Free Trade, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 23,
2016) (describing how economist David Autor is trying to change American
thinking on the issue of free trade, to explain that in the areas most affected
by trade agreements, the effects have really been “a big deal”). Note that
Autor does not promote protectionism, he identifies the rise in transfer
payments following the shifting a manufacturing jobs to China and that
transfer payments may be a means of redistributing the broader economic
benefits of lowering manufacturing costs. See Autor, supra, at 2155-59.
27 See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV.
INT’L. L.J. 203 (2007) (considering calls to integrate social standards and
labor rights into free trade agreements); Jill Lynn Nissen, Achieving a
Balance Between Trade and the Environment; the Need to Amend the
WTO/GATT to Include Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 28 LAW &
POL’Y. INT’L. BUS. 901 (1997) (analyzing the relationship between the WTO
24
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transferring operations to hospitable labor sites like China and
Mexico was known, but hardly registered as an “issue” worth
exploring, politically or academically. Silently, and in an
atmosphere of quiet resentment on the part of the workers, the
factories kept closing.28 No one knew when this process would
come to an end, or if it would ever end. No one seemed to fully
understand what the end game was, or what forces were at work
beneath the surface. Week by week, the structure of national
economies was changing and evolving, and most people felt less
secure about the economic future. That more globalization
brought about more international inequality is also
unmistakable.
This failure to address the anxieties caused at least in
part by “free trade”, especially considering the outlandish
promises that had been made to the rank and file of workers in
many countries, was an example of intellectual and political
neglect that is hard to fathom.29 How could the value or meaning
of “free trade” laws be analyzed without taking the hard fact of
job losses, job insecurity and destruction of smaller businesses
into account? And yet, this state of affairs lasted almost
unchanged at the level of political discourse until the
earthquake of the Presidential campaign season of 2015-2016.
During that campaign, the long-buried issues of trade,
jobs and a traditional economic and social identity burst into the
open, with the ideological victory going to those who had first
grasped hold of the issue and used it for their own political
reasons. Most notable in this group, of course, was Donald
Trump, whose campaign would almost certainly have been a
and multilateral environmental agreements following the Uruguay Round of
GATT and suggesting amendments to GATT will be necessary); Debra M.
Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms:
Importing Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 Food & Drug L.J. 167 (2006)
(reviewing disparate food labeling regulations around the world and
suggesting a uniform international regulatory regime be implemented).
28 See, e.g., Paul Harris, ‘I’m Sick to My Stomach’: Anger Grows in Illinois at
Bain’s
Latest
Outsourcing
Plan,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
10,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/10/illinois-workers-bainoutsourcing (describing Bain Capital’s role in an Illinois plant closure, during
which the affected American workers were required to train the Chinese who
would have their jobs after the outsourcing was completed).
29 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, NAFTA’s Legacy: Growing U.S. Trade Deficits
Cost
682,900
Jobs,
ECON.
POL’Y.
INST.
(Dec.
17,
2013),
http://www.epi.org/publication/nafta-legacy-growing-us-trade-deficits-cost682900-jobs/ (noting that Bill Clinton promised that NAFTA would increase
good-paying American jobs, but that things did not turn out as Clinton has
predicted).
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failure had it not been for his early grasp of the fact that voters
in the “Rust Belt” constituted a large, untapped and to some
extent overlooked voting bloc ripe for picking.30 As implausible
as it was that a New York casino mogul would seriously
champion the traditional working class at the level of economic
policy, the prospect of manufacturing jobs being returned to the
American heartland was a seemingly irresistible siren call. 31
Trump’s followers wanted to believe that he would represent
their views to multinational manufacturers, tempting them with
fabulous “deals” to remain in the United States, employing
people in traditional pursuits at traditionally high wages. That
belief, along with a healthy dose of resentment against
immigrants, minorities and foreign governments gave the
election season an unusually high degree of political heat, and
an often-demagogic seduction.32
IV.

WHY WASN’T THE TRADE AND JOB SECURITY ISSUE
OBVIOUS TO ALL?
As someone who wrote doggedly about trade law and the
effects on labor from the mid-1990s onward, I was well aware
that this explosive issue was broadly ignored. It seemed selfevidently true to me that there was a problem with using
See Moshe Marvit, Trump Promised to Help Workers in the Rust Belt.
Here’s How He Can Show He’s Serious, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/08/trumppromised-to-help-workers-in-the-rust-belt-heres-how-he-can-show-hesserious/?utm_term=.fd0274dadd97 (noting that “Donald Trump hung his
winning presidential campaign on the idea that he alone could bring back
American jobs.”).
31 See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of
Populism: Economic Have-nots and Cultural Backlash 11 (Harv. Kennedy
Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP16-026, Aug. 2016),
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1401
(summarizing common explanation for rise in populism and why economically
vulnerable populations gravitate towards authoritarian leaders when
migrants and terrorism threaten their way of life, including their jobs in
manufacturing); Nathan M. Jensen et al., Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and
the Global Competition for Investment, INT’L. STUD. Q., Dec. 2013, at 6-7
(discussing survey finding group more likely to vote for governor willing to
provide tax incentives to manufacturer locating facility in state).
32 See Jill Abramson, Trump’s Rise is the Return of the Demagogue, GUARDIAN
(Feb.
29,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/29/donald-trump-uselection-2016-demagogue (recapping a trump event filled with an angry
crowd lashing out at lass of manufacturing jobs and mass immigration and
observing similarities between past demagogic and segregationist candidates
like George Wallace and Ross Perot).
30
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eighteenth century free trade doctrines as a means to allow
multinational corporations to save on their labor costs.33 David
Ricardo, in an age far less technologically advanced and without
the possibility of mobile manufacturing, emphasized national
specialization based on national advantages in the manufacture
of certain goods.34 In our own age, when “free trade” would allow
for global competition between different labor pools, the
implications were completely different. Of course, it must be
noted that many of the job losses apparently “caused” by the
operation of free trade agreements were in fact the result of
automation, and that free trade in and of itself is not the sole
cause of economic disruption. 35 However, it consistently
bothered me that the element of global “labor competition” took
little if any part in mainstream analyses of international trade
law studies. From a commonsense point of view, this aspect of
the global “free movement of goods” must be of grave concern to
people working in the manufacturing sector in the more
advanced economies—logically, how could it not be?
It gives me no great pleasure to have been right on this
issue. From the time international trade law became a “law
school” subject in the mid-1990s, trade law scholars completely
missed the larger “job loss” implications, having spent the
greatest amount of time parsing and analyzing legal issues that
See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO:
Corporations,
Academics, and ‘Member States’, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE
STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 53, 54 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Opportunism and the WTO] (emphasizing that post-1995 trade
law is not based on comparative advantage, it is based on the needs of
transnational businesses); see also Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note
23, at 1020 (arguing instead of focusing on individual trade disputes, trade
scholars should focus on opportunistic corporations and the “underpinnings of
the entire global trade system”); Sara Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”:
International Trade Law and Global Sustainability Indicators, 55 Rut. L.
Rev. 87, 112 (2002) [hereinafter A Farewell to “Linkage”] (noting Ricardo
himself knew that theory of comparative advantage only made sense if both
capital and labor were immobile).
34 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 49-50 (11th ed. 2009) (discussing Ricardo’s discovery of the principle
of comparative advantage). The principle of comparative advantage, in
theory, allows a country to benefit even when trading with a country that
makes a product less efficiently than it because the country is able to
specialize in and produce more of another product it makes even more
efficiently than the product being traded. See id.
35 See Brian Heater, Technology Is Killing Jobs, and Only Technology Can
Save
Them,
TECHCRUNCH
(Mar.
26,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/26/technology-is-killing-jobs-and-onlytechnology-can-save-them/.
33
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were—from the point of view of ordinary people-- essentially a
sideshow.36 In the mid-1990s, trade law moved from economics
departments to law schools, and it is easy to explain why. This
was because 1990s trade agreements like those of the WTO and
NAFTA created genuinely “enforceable” dispute resolution
mechanisms, and legal academics feel at home studying
disputes: the details of the disputes, the legal provisions being
invoked, and similar comfortably “legal” issues.37 While there is
nothing wrong with an academic approach that centers on trade
disputes per se, this disproportionate focus tended to mask the
real “action”--political, legal and economic: that the robust
elimination of most trade barriers due to the trade agreements
of the 1990s opened the door to an unprecedented mobility of
manufacturing.38 When a product can flow freely without fiscal
or regulatory impediments, it can also be manufactured in any
convenient location. That is part of the indisputable logic of
eliminating most barriers to trade in goods, wherever
manufactured. 39 It wasn’t so much foreign governments that
took advantage of that reality—rather, it was American
multinational corporations that took the opportunity to further
enrich themselves at the expense of silently frustrated American
workers.
It may seem obvious, though it went surprisingly
unremarked by mainstream commentators and academics, that
mobility of manufacturing meant that workers in the US and
elsewhere would be competing, quite literally, with workers in

Of course, some—though not many—trade law scholars saw and analyzed
the problem of trade agreements versus workers’ rights. See, e.g., Chantell
Taylor, NAFTA, GATT and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous
Double Standard for Workers’ Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y. 401
(2000) (comparing corporate rights under NAFTA and GATT and workers’
rights under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation).
37 See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade
Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 (2006) (noting the transition for a negotiation-based
to a rules-based, legal dispute oriented free trade system).
38 See Nicholas R. Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, BROOKINGS (May
9,
2001),
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wtoaccession/ (describing the dynamic process by which a national economy, in
this case China’s, becomes embedded in free trade structures and draws in
foreign manufacturers).
39 See David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?:
The Real Issue Lurking
Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L. L. 279, 312 (2001)
(questioning disparate meanings of free trade and noting any tax or
regulation constitutes some form of trade barrier, often intended to
disadvantage foreign producers).
36
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lower-wage countries. 40 This kind of very dramatic wage
competition would lead inevitably to a significant number of job
losses, and would transform the economy and even the basic
tenor of life itself.
The power of labor depends in large measure on the
employer not having a “choice”—if the negotiating worker can be
easily replaced (in this case by workers abroad), there is little
incentive for the employer to give heed to the wishes of the
workforce.41 As mentioned above, there is lively debate over the
number of jobs lost due to wage competition versus
automation—the fact remains, though, that middle-class
American workers simply could not successfully compete with
workers making one tenth or one quarter of what US workers
expected to earn.42 No number of “side agreements” on labor and
environmental standards could alter this hard fact. 43 Asserting
that American workers are “the best in the world” does not
change the reality that the wage differentials in different parts
of the world are striking. Manufacturers would chase cheaper
labor in other parts of the world--notably in China--and the
American heartland that counted on factory jobs would be
hollowed out.44 This uncomfortable truth was rarely mentioned
in political speeches, yet was one of the main elements of a

See Uri Dadush & William Shaw, Is the Labor Market Global?, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT’L
PEACE
(Jan.
3,
2012),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/03/is-labor-market-global-pub-46388
(writing that “[t]he labor market is integrated in the sense that workers are
competing for the same jobs, even if the jobs move to the workers rather than
the other way around.”).
41 See Kim Moody, What to Know About the WTO: A Union Activist’s Guide,
LABOR NOTES (Feb. 1, 2000), http://www.labornotes.org/2000/02/what-knowabout-wto-union-activists-guide (denying that the WTO was really about
creating “rules based trade,” but instead about enhancing the power of
multinational corporations vis a vis governments and labor unions).
42 See DEAN MCFARLIN & PAUL D. SWEENEY, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT:
STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES & CULTURAL CHALLENGES 340-43 (5th ed. 2015)
(observing difficulty American workers have keeping up with hard-working
and technically trained workers in China and India that work for one tenth
the pay of Americans).
43 See Joel Solomon, Trading Away Rights:
The Unfulfilled Promise of
NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (April 2001),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nafta/nafta0401.pdf (identifying structural
weaknesses and cautious use of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation as major impediments to its success).
44 See Trymaine Lee, The Heartland: Life and Loss in Steel City, MSNBC
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/geographyofpovertyheartland-1 (exploring the shocking level of deprivation caused by factory
closures in the worst-affected areas of the United States).
40
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“changed world” for workers in the manufacturing sector in the
United States and elsewhere.
Thus, far from the specialized scenes of trade law
conferences, workers who saw their jobs disappear were
apparently, and not surprisingly, growing angrier. As I had been
writing about this disconnect for years, my original view was
confirmed. Indeed, the likelihood of such an eventual reaction by
American labor struck me forcefully, virtually from the very
moment the WTO came into being.45 It was clear to me that the
traditional trade model of exporting one’s national goods and
importing the national goods of other countries and regions was
breaking down as an operative concept. 46 Mobility of
manufacturing
became
an
imperative
for
American
manufacturers, as big box stores practically ordered American
companies to reduce product prices below a certain bottom
line.47
As I saw the problem from the late 1990s onward, the
discipline of trade law studies had become fixated on narrow
questions relevant to the WTO disputes in particular. This was
troublesome not only because it was a distraction of sorts. More
concerning, it fostered the illusion, or was based on the illusion,
that global trade had an inherent “nation versus nation”
dimension—whereas in fact, multinational corporations did not
much care where they operated, either from a manufacturing,
profit-making or tax- paying point of view. 48 The eighteenth
century paradigm, as mentioned above, was one in which
nations produced certain goods, goods which they then traded
with other nations, for goods produced by those other nations.49
See, e.g., Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”, supra note 33, at 112 (calling for
an empirical approach to adverse effects of international trade agreements).
46 See id. at 54 (describing the inadequacy of the concept of comparative
advantage in modern times).
47 See COMMANDING HEIGHTS PBS (2002) (indicating retailers like Walmart
required U.S. firms to purchase from Chinese factories to lower costs); see
also Hiroko Tabuchi, Walmart’s Imports From China Displaced 400,000 Jobs,
A
Study
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
9,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/business/economy/walmart-chinaimports-job-losses.html.
48 See Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note 23, at 1020-22 (explaining
one must consider wishes of powerful transnational corporations to
understand trade agreements and arguing WTO should shift focus away from
nation verse nation disputes).
49 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World
Trade Constitution,
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521–25 (2000) (explaining, in theory, free trade
benefits all countries over time).
45
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But by 1995 and beyond, such a conception of international
trade was misleading at best. Much of the “trade” the US did
with China involved goods made in China by US-based
corporations. 50 As with tax avoidance, US and other
multinationals were heavily involved in “labor rights avoidance”,
and wanted to have full access to the globe in search of the best
labor at the lowest possible price.51 This was possible precisely
because trade laws had, from the end of World War II, led in the
direction of eliminating tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, and
increasingly even regulatory barriers. If goods and services can
move freely without impediment, so can manufacturers.
In short, the trade laws that were promulgated in the
1990s attempted to ensure a permanent, unendingly neoliberal
approach to international commerce. 52 The idea was that
governments would come and go, but free trade rules would
remain enshrined in international law, as received by virtually
all trading nations of the world.53 The WTO became a forum for
the display of legal virtuosity by such rising nations as India
and Brazil.54 The operation of the WTO made it seem as if the
world economy would inevitably remain integrated in nature,
and that the future was knowable.55

See Chad P. Brown, U.S.-China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the WTO,
33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 27, 38-39 (Winter/Spring 2009 (highlighting
factors U.S. must consider when making threats towards China, including
that many Chinese exports derive from subsidiaries of U.S.-based
multinational corporations).
51 See Lance A. Compa, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and the Battle for Labor
Rights,
CORNELL
U.
ILR
SCH.
(2001),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1376&contex
t=articles.
52 See FAUX, supra note 7, at 179-80 (describing constitutional components of
NAFTA and the WTO); see also Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note 23,
at 1031 (remarking on immutable, constitutional aspects of WTO’s trade
rules).
53 See Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note 23, at 1017 (pointing out
Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations constitutionalized free trade ideas and
placed policies out of political leaders’ reach).
54 See Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO, supra note 33, at 66 (naming Brazil
and India as countries clearly using the WTO to their strategic national
advantage).
55 The need for predictability (as opposed to the uncertain outcomes of a more
politicized system) was the core rationale for the creation of the WTO’s newly
enforceable system of dispute settlement. See Introduction to the WTO
Dispute
Settlement
System,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s3p1_e
.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2017) (noting that “A central objective of the
50

16:2

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

20

V.
MESSAGE TO CANDIDATE CLINTON ON THE ANTI-TRADE
WAVE
When Barack Obama was first elected president in 2008,
it seemed he wanted to carry out some version of a do-over of
America’s trade relations with the rest of the world. 56 For a
time, it seemed as if he would consider rewriting NAFTA or even
terminating America’s involvement in the WTO.57 None of this,
of course, happened, despite his criticism of unfettered free
trade. 58 Instead, quietly and persistently, the Obama
administration moved to create even more ambitious free trade
structures, including the now notorious TPP and TTIP. 59 It
appears that over time, President Obama came to emphasize not
the job-loss dimension of free trade, but rather the geopolitical
aspects, through which global alliances are fostered, and global
power exerted.60
It is important to emphasize that free trade has this
second, non-economic dimension in the realm of global
(WTO) dispute settlement system is to provide security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system.”).
56
See
Barack
Obama
on
Free
Trade,
ON
THE
ISSUES,
http://www.ontheissues.org/2008/Barack_Obama_Free_Trade.htm
(last
visited Aug. 22, 2017) (indicating that then-candidate Obama was strongly
critical of existing free trade structures and determined to fundamentally
alter them—which in the end, he arguably did not seriously attempt to do).
57 See id.
58 See Jaime Fuller, Why Almost Everyone Hates the Trade Deal Obama’s
Negotiating
in
Japan,
WASH.
POST
(April
23,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/23/why-almosteveryone-hates-the-trade-deal-obamas-negotiating-injapan/?utm_term=.079e46f9d892 (explaining that, despite Obama’s insistence
that the Trans-Pacific Partnership was the new “gold standard” for trade
agreements, it was meeting resistance from many different quarters,
politically and geographically).
59 See, e.g., Trevor Timm, The TTIP and TPP Trade Deals: Enough of the
Secrecy,
GUARDIAN
(May
4,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/04/ttip-tpp-tradedeals-secrecy-greenpeace-leak (decrying the lack of transparency in the
negotiating of these two major trade agreements sought by President Obama
as part of his legacy).
60 See I.M. Destler, America’s Uneasy History with Free Trade, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/americas-uneasy-history-withfree-trade (suggesting that the “New Democrats” support for free trade is
based on its ability to buttress U.S. leadership role in international economy).
Although President Obama did not focus much on trade in his first term, he
became an active advocate for the Trans-Pacific Partnership in his second
term and argued the agreement was vital to global partnerships and the
establishment of rules for the global economy. See id.
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leadership, and Obama realized over time that the US could
exert influence through expanded regional trade agreements.61
As is well known, these two ambitious, large-scale agreements
that would further extend the reach of free trade laws in the
direction of Asia and the EU, became toxic political subjects
during the 2015-2016 presidential campaign. All major
candidates of the 2016 presidential race disavowed the TPP, and
the assumption is that it has died a quiet death.62 From the time
then candidate Trump took up the issue of trade and job losses,
there was no going back to the earlier status quo, and decades of
failure to mention the inconvenient facts on employment effects
had to be paid for.
During the 2015-2016 presidential campaign, it became
obvious that Donald Trump had essentially expropriated the
issue of trade and jobs.63 I marveled at the fact that the Clinton
campaign had not figured out a way to “own” that issue, or to
confront it. After twenty years of hearing that free trade would
lead to more and better jobs (in some cases it has, but in many
not), the American public was tired of the pro-free trade rhetoric
and required something more concrete.64 Reflecting their long-

See William Finnegan, Why Does Obama Want This Trade Deal So Badly,
THE NEW YORKER (June 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/why-does-obama-want-the-trans-pacific-partnership-so-badly
(suggesting that Obama’s chief motivation was to enhance U.S. influence in
Asia and reduce China’s).
62 During the 2016 presidential campaign season, all major candidates were
of the stated view that the TPP was flawed and should not be pursued. See
2016 Presidential Candidates on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/2016_presidential_candidates_on_the_TransPacific_Partnership_trade_deal (last visited Aug. 22, 2017); see also Trump
Signs Executive Order to Formally Withdraw the US From the Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Trade
Deal,
CNBC
(Jan.
23,
2017),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/23/trump-signs-executive-order-to-formallywithdraw-the-us-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal.html
(reporting that Trump called this act of withdrawal a “great thing for the
American worker”).
63 See, e.g., Cristiano Lima, Trump Calls Trade Deal ‘A Rape of Our Country’,
POLITICO
(June
28,
2016,
8:20
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-trans-pacificpartnership-224916 (noting the inflammatory rhetoric used by Trump to
describe existing trade agreements and the politicians who had supported
them).
64 See Diane Stafford, Campaign Anti-trade Rhetoric Won’t Lead to Quick
Changes after Elections, Experts Say, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 3, 2016. 04:37
PM),
http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/article112379237.html
(describing one expert as saying that “Great disbelief in ‘experts’ and feelings
61
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running bafflement with the process of job loss and factory
closings, many gravitated to Trump’s promise that he would
(somehow, through a method unspecified) force companies to
remain in the United States and not move abroad to
manufacture. If they did move abroad, he insisted, he would slap
their imports into the United States with a “35% tariff.” When
he repeated that simplistic formula, to many listeners it
sounded like a concrete plan; like something could be done
besides lamenting the factory losses and proposing job
retraining.65
There are many legal, economic and factual difficulties
surrounding Trump’s by now famous assertion. However, it was
indisputable that Trump had taken what should have been in
general terms a progressive policy position (saving jobs through
better regulation of the problems caused by outsourcing) and
turned it into a personal crusade. He told his audiences time
and again that he alone could save their jobs and their fading
middle class lifestyles.66 He would vindicate their disappointed
expectations, their broken communities, and stop treating the
effects of free trade as inevitable. It was a highly effective
strategy. Indeed, this was likely the one and only issue Trump
benefited from enough to push him over the top to win the
Electoral College.
In the early spring of 2016, I saw this political
configuration on the horizon and wrote a brief memo, intended
to be shared with the Clinton campaign.67 It is likely it never
reached the campaign, or if it did, that it was not successfully
channeled.
The essence of the memo was this:
That
mainstream politicians had utterly failed to address the anger
felt by formerly middle-class people who attributed their job
of being left out of prosperity are pervasive among both British and American
voters”).
65 See Sahil Kapur, Trump’s ‘Retribution’ Tax Stirs Questions, GOP
Resistance,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-05/trump-s-retributiontax-stirs-legal-questions-gop-resistance (highlighting importance of Trump’s
tariff threat to white voters without college degrees that made up one third of
2016 electorate and helped Trump win rustbelt states).
66 See Michael Martinez, Why Ford Made Trump Look Like A Jobs Savior,
AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS
(Nov.
18,
2016),
http://www.autonews.com/article/20161118/BLOG06/161119824/why-fordmade-trump-look-like-a-jobs-savior (writing that “[i]f you ask Donald Trump,
he just saved thousands of US jobs that big, bad Ford Motor Co. was about to
move to Mexico.” The writer continues, “[t]o borrow a line from his recent
presidential debate performance: ‘Wrong’”).
67 Memo on file with author.
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losses and economic decline to the effects of free trade. Rather
than coming up with actual laws that would deal directly with
outsourcing (by creating clear and fairly applied penalties and
disincentives for outsourcing US jobs to lower-wage countries),
Trump was transforming the issue into a United States versus
Country X kind of issue: i.e , US versus Mexico, US versus
China.68 In fact, it was US companies that had sought out the
cheaper labor and more advantageous regulatory environments
offered by these countries, but Trump decided to present the
problem as if the host countries for American investment were
acting to the detriment of the US.69 Trump’s strategy had the
two-fold effect of channeling working class anger against the
“elites” who had allowed the factory closures, and also of
channeling that same anger against foreigners and their
governments.
It seemed that it would have been relatively easy at that
point for Hillary Clinton to acknowledge the problem and
reframe it, offering a much better, more rational and effective
remedy in the form of legally-defined penalties for US companies
engaging in outsourcing behavior. Needless to say, Secretary
Clinton did not set out any such clearly defined solutions to the
problem of jobs outsourcing. 70 Donald Trump continued to
emphasize the issue of trade and jobs, occasionally berating US
companies, but more particularly the countries in which they
were setting up manufacturing outlets, and crucially, the
politicians who had entered into supposedly “bad deals.”71 This
See Jeffrey Bartash, Trump Calls US-Mexico Trade One-sided—and Here’s
the
Reality,
MARKET
WATCH
(Jan.
27,
2017),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-calls-us-mexico-trade-one-sidedheres-the-reality-2017-01-26; see also Joseph Stiglitz, Trump’s Most Chilling
Economic
Lie,
VANITY
FAIR
(Feb.
17,
2017),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/02/donald-trump-china-economics-trade
(pointing out that “the very Americans who have been among the losers of
globalization stand to be among the losers of a reversal of globalization—
including a trade war. History cannot be put into reverse.”).
69 See Matthew Yglesias, Donald Trump Is Going to Bring Us Trade Wars,
Big Time, VOX (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/1/20/14323686/trummp-trade-war (referring to Trump’s “plan to
use ad hoc tariffs to initiate and ‘win’ trade wars with foreign countries.”).
70 See Kellan Howell, Hillary Clinton’s Outsourcing Problem With Union
Workers,
CIRCA
(July
25,
2016),
https://www.circa.com/story/2016/07/25/politics/hillary-clintons-outsourcingproblem-with-union-workers (describing negative reactions to her stated idea
that much of the outsourcing that has happened was “inevitable”).
71 See Vicki Needham, Trump Vows to Overhaul “Horrible” Trade Deals, THE
HILL (July 21, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/288812-trump-vow-tooverhaul-us-trade-policy (quoting then-candidate Trump as stating the he
68
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put the focus on himself as capable of delivering a remedy,
rather than increasing the understanding of the public as to the
reasons for the phenomenon, or committing to create legally
appropriate incentives and penalties. 72 In the end, of course,
Trump won the presidency and has to a lesser extent continued
on the same path of personal trade savior.
VI.

THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR FREE TRADE POLICIES

In order to fully appreciate the trade-based historical
drama we witnessed in 2015-2016, we need to understand the
post-World War II free trade ethos, the acceleration of
manufacturing job losses within the United States and the
faulty interpretation placed on all this by Donald Trump, while
simultaneously taking credit for being the person able to “do
something” about America’s trade-based economic insecurity.
It is obvious that “free trade” has brought economic
diversity and prosperity to many societies over thousands of
years.73 Trade is as common to the restless human species as
population movement itself. In the modern age, the eighteenth
century saw an explosion in sea-borne trade, buoyed by the
supporting theory of “comparative advantage.” 74 According to
the concept of comparative advantage, nations would always
benefit from specializing in that which they were relatively
better at making. 75 They could then trade with other nations
would “never sign any trade agreement that hurts our workers, or that
diminishes our freedom and independence.”). This emphasis on what the
President will or will not sign gives the mistaken impression that there are
no other dynamics at play, and that the issue hinges on the determination of
one person not to “sign” the bad agreement.
72 See David Lawder & David Shepardson, Trump Is Preparing Orders to
Review Trade Deals, Procurement: Officials, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/03/24/trump-executive-order-trade-deal/.
73 See generally WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE
SHAPED THE WORLD (2008) (providing a comprehensive look at the processes
that drove virtually all civilizations to trade, and how these complex
processes led to the modern world as we know it).
74 See K.N. Chaudhuri, The Structure of the Indian Textile Industry in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, INDIAN ECON. & SOC. HISTORY REV.,
Apr. 1974, at 127, 139-40 (discussing trading relationship between Britain
and Bengal and noting shift towards sea-borne trade due to lower costs and
comparative advantage in Bengal).
75 See Murray N. Rothbard, The Ricardian Law of Comparative Advantage,
MISES INSTITUTE (April 26, 2012), https://mises.org/library/ricardian-lawcomparative-advantage (contrasting the earlier and simpler notion of
national “absolute advantage,” with the more challenging concept of
comparative advantage).
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from the goods they had decided to specialize in. David Ricardo
popularized this idea, which in the end boiled down to the
truism that it always paid for nations to specialize and trade
with one another in the products of that specialization. 76 All
nations should then focus on producing those items that they
were able to make relatively more efficiently, a process that
would always lead to relatively better outcomes.77
This doctrine of comparative advantage, an intellectual
antique, is hardly suited to the modern era. 78 As mentioned
above, it derives from an age when manufacturing was
inherently immobile—with a static relationship to geography. In
reality, the doctrine says no more than prosperity though
product prioritization: prosperity in each country will be greater
if each nation decides which products it is best at producing and
sticks to those products. Do not try to make everything you can
make, even if you can make a wide variety of things better than
others. It pays to specialize, as more wealth will be generated.
Arithmetically, it seemed an attractive proposition. But for use
in the world of the early 21st century, it does not seem to amount
to much.79
This seemingly simple idea has proven very enduring, in
part because of a lack of conceptual competition. Over centuries,
through periods of open trade borders and relative
protectionism, “comparative advantage” has propelled countries
forward, often without much attention being paid to the
empirical effects of trade liberalization. Especially in the 1990s,
when the world turned in the direction of predictable,
enforceable trade laws, the focus was almost completely on the
imagined benefits of more and more free trade, and greater
elimination of all kinds of trade barriers, tariff and non-tariff.80

See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 34, at 48 (exhibiting importance of
specialization to obtaining benefits of comparative advantage).
77 See Rothbard, supra note 75.
78 See Reinhard Schumacher, Deconstructing the Theory of Comparative
Advantage, 2 WORLD SOCIAL & ECON. REV. 84 (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://wer.worldeconomicsassociation.org/files/WEA-WER2-Schumacher.pdf
(noting that for Ricardo, the immobility of labor and capital were taken for
granted, an assumption that is obviously outdated today).
79 See Vladimir A. Masch, The Myth of Comparative Advantage, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vladimir-a-masch/themyth-of-comparative-a_b_581814.html (stating that the law of Comparative
Advantage “is not a true ‘law’—at best, it is a rule of thumb, not often
applicable).
80 See Kyle Bagwell, Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, Is the WTO Passé?,
54:4
J.
ECON.
LITERATURE
1125
(2016),
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Statements were made about the explosion of prosperity that
would be generally experienced by participating countries; few
bothered to question this orthodoxy, and its proponents almost
always prevailed in debate.81
As regional and global trade rules became more binding,
more enforceable and more generally legalistic throughout the
1990s, the effects of free trade in people’s lives—including the
negative effects—began to be felt. As described above, the
traditional ideal of free trade is that there are “national”
products and these products are traded with other national
products, in a virtuous chain of events. However, it became quite
apparent that one of the main motivations behind the trade
agreements, which allowed products to flow without impediment
across borders, was to facilitate mobility of manufacturing. 82
The decision of companies to relocate in cheaper wage locations
(and lower regulation nations) was not random or sporadic.
Large retailers, and by extension consumers, demanded that the
bottom line cost of products should be lower, and factories
shuttered and moved to China, among other countries, to take
advantage of these lower labor costs.83
The logic of the terms of trade agreements could have
made all this quite foreseeable. Yet, politicians and even trade
law specialists rarely mentioned these possibly negative
outcomes. While it is true that a great deal of manufacturing job
loss is due to automation—and that this will continue—it was
also starkly true that American workers were being passed over
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~rstaiger/BBS_JEL_2016.pdf
(describing
the
process of development of modern trade laws).
81 See Dani Rodrik, The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why So
Late? Why Now? Will it Last?, VOTING FOR REFORM: DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL
LIBERALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 61, 62 (Stephen Haggard &
Steven B. Webb eds. 1994) (describing developing countries’ rushing to free
trade as if it were the “Holy Grail of economic development”); Helen V.
Milner, The Political Economy of International Trade, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
91, 92 (1999) (describing flock to free trade regimes in 1990s and scholarly
coverage of the phenomenon); Denise Froning, The Benefits of Free Trade: A
Guide
for
Policymakers,
HERITAGE FOUND.
(Aug.
25,
2000),
http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-benefits-free-trade-guidepolicymakers (promoting benefits free trade creates for all, including more
options for consumers and the free flow of ideas as well as goods).
82 See Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO, supra note 33, at 54 (concluding
further mobility in manufacturing sought to escape organized labor and
regulatory oversight in developed nations).
83 See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S
ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 10-12 (2017) (providing charts and analysis of China’s
manufacturing dominance since the late 1970s).

27

Getting the “Message” on Free Trade: Globalization, Jobs and the World…

in favor of workers who simply cost far less. 84 The power of
workers relative to the power of the corporation was
substantially rewritten in the 1990s, and a certain quiet rage
began to grow beneath the surface.85 As indicated above, trade
scholars only rarely confronted this issue, preferring esoteric
discussion of trade disputes, standards used by the global trade
bodies, etc. It was assumed that the trade regime that had been
put in place in the mid-1990s, designed to create a global
marketplace—was now “constitutional” in nature, and would
last essentially forever. Objections to the system were dismissed
as “protectionist”.86 When the job loss issue was alluded to, it
was in general terms, such as with a clichéd acknowledgment
that there are “winners and losers” in the operation of free trade
rules.87
As also described above, there is a second, somewhat more
hidden, justification for free trade as a policy. This justification
is more political and does not pretend to be based on some
immutable laws of economics. This side of the free trade
rationale is the preservation of peace, and the establishment of
national influence. Almost as pervasive as the idea of
comparative advantage is the idea that countries that engage in
high levels of trade with one another are highly unlikely to
engage in armed hostilities.88 Thus, as trade produces a more
See Robert E. Scott, Unfair Trade Deals Lower the Wages of US Workers,
ECON.
POL’Y.
INST.:
FACTSHEET
(Mar.
13,
2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/unfair-trade-deals-lower-the-wages-of-u-sworkers/ (noting that U.S. workers have been displaced and their bargaining
power weakened through the operation of international trade agreements).
85 See Heather Long & Patrick Gillespie, Why Americans Are So Angry in
2016,
CNN
MONEY
(Mar.
9,
2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/09/news/economy/donald-trump-berniesanders-angry-america/index.html (writing that “[Americans] believe the
middle class is dying, trade is killing US jobs and that their kids won’t have a
chance to get ahead.”).
86 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, How to Demolish Protectionist Myths,
GUARDIAN
(July
5,
2010),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jul/05/free-tradeprotectionist-myths (writing, as one of the foremost “anti-protectionist
writers,” about common protectionist arguments rejected by academics).
87 See Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming
the Law of Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 797, 831-32 (analyzing
effects of free trade, such as job loss and high unemployment rates, through
winners to losers lens, and suggesting winners should provide “trade-related
adjustment assistance” to losers).
88 See
JONATHAN SCHELL, THE UNCONQUERABLE WORLD:
POWER,
NONVIOLENCE, AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 36 (2004) (“An unbroken thread
of faith in free trade as an abettor of peace runs through the entire tradition
84
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prosperous world, it is also believed to help create and preserve
a more peaceful and stable one.
Even before the end of World War II, the Allies
demonstrated their belief that protectionism had been a
contributing factor leading to war, and sought to remove
barriers to post-war trade. 89 The Bretton Woods Agreements
aimed at the creation of rules to guide a calmer, more
prosperous and integrated post-war order, one in which free
trade would be a centerpiece. 90 Agreed-upon rules would
restrain national governments and push back against the
temptation to indulge in nationalistic approaches to economic
behavior. 91 The GATT rules were designed to prevent “backsliding”, and the multilateral GATT system was, interestingly,
open to all interested nations. Like the EEC that followed in the
1950s, the GATT had a clear political motivation. While it is
perhaps satisfying to consider that “peace and prosperity” are
the twin pillars holding up the house of multilateral trade, it is
also the case that the often unfounded faith in comparative
advantage was able to shield the effects of trade rules from
empirically-based scrutiny. In other words, the articles of faith
that supported the GATT/WTO system had a dangerous
tendency to mask signs of dissatisfaction with the system’s
adverse effects.92 Thus, for those in the American heartland who
watched as their local factories closed down and moved abroad,
the indifference of policy makers became especially galling.
The Age of Trump has been highly revealing in this sense.
Even those who have been critical of the global trading system
of liberal internationalism, surviving many disappointments and continuing,
if in attenuated form, to this day.”).
89 See Jason Margolis, The US Tried Extra-high Tariffs Before, in 1930. It
Was A Disaster, PRI (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-02-01/ustried-extra-high-tariffs-1930-it-was-disaster (arguing that it was not until
after World War I that “American leaders developed a new way of looking at
commerce” that did not rely on high external tariffs).
90 See ERIC HELLEINER, FORGOTTEN FOUNDATION OF BRETTON WOODS:
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE MAKING OF THE POSTWAR ORDER
(2014).
91 See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT’L. L. 379, 385-92 (1996)
(providing a detailed history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)). The GATT was the result of the Bretton Woods negotiations, the
purpose of which was to establish a post-World War II global financial order,
including a commitment to the elimination of trade barriers and adherence to
free trade principles. See id.
92 See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 410-26 (2002) (discussing
the conflict and intersection of globalization and nationalism, and the role of
free trade).
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for its destructive effects on jobs must recognize that the second
pillar of free trade--integration and peace--is a significant
political asset. While Trump treats the trade dilemma as a
simple matter of “jobs warfare”, a contentious, disruptive
approach to trade agreements cannot be the correct solution,
either. Demanding that factories that have gone to Mexico under
NAFTA return to the US under pain of tariff punishment, or
threatening war with China as a “trade enemy” is the antithesis
of the actual peace that global trade rules have in fact fostered.
In this sense, the “peace” pillar of free trade doctrine was more
reliable than the prosperity pillar, and cannot be lightly set
aside.93 In addition, the rules-based system that moved us away
from a unilateralist and pressure-oriented approach to trade
relations is also to be applauded.94
To that extent, the international treaties that led to the
creation of the WTO, NAFTA and other free trade agreements
are properly seen as part of public international law and of the
international rule of law in the post-World War II era. 95 As
objectionable as a smug economic constitutionalism might have
been in the wake of the WTO’s creation, the concept of a fully
integrated economic world was far from a bad idea.96 Indeed, the
fact that virtually all trading nations signed on to the WTO is
telling.97 The fact that Russia was the last of the major economic
See Erich Weede, The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace By Globalization,
THE
INDEPENDENT
REVIEW
165
(Fall
2004),
http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_2_1_weede.pdf
(arguing
that,
despite its vulnerabilities, free trade is the best way of fostering peace and
prosperity).
94 See Krzysztof J. Pelc, Will Trump’s Unilateral Trade Approach Work?
History
Says
No,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
7,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/07/willtrumps-unilateral-trade-approach-work-history-saysno/?utm_term=.d4244a91e396 (arguing that options available for exerting
unilateral trade pressure under US law did not prove to be successful in the
years before the creation of the WTO).
95 See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How
WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (2003) (describing the
manner in which global trade law is now embedded in the larger framework
of public international law).
96 See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 658 (1996)
(criticizing modern trade law but pointing out the enduring benefits,
economic and political, of free trade).
97 Nearly all important trading nations are now WTO members. One notable
exception, however, is Iran. See Members and Observers of the WTO, WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/org6_map_e.htm
(last
visited Aug. 22, 2017) (providing map indicating member and non-member
countries).
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powers to enter the WTO is also instructive.98 The global free
trade regime cuts in several directions; generally negative from
the point of view of labor rights, generally positive when seen in
terms of international peace and technological advancement.
More than anything, it was a failure to acknowledge the depth
and severity of the socio-economic disruption accompanying
NAFTA and the WTO that opened the door to Candidate
Trump’s misrepresentations as to exactly what was wrong with
modern trade agreements--or “deals” as he inaccurately called
them. Also noteworthy to date is the degree to which he has
failed to act on his promises to reject all of the “bad deals” and
restore the earlier rights and protections of American workers.99
VII.

TRUMP

AND THE
LIKE TO DESTROY?

WTO’S DSU—HOW

MUCH WOULD HE

During the “GATT” period, from 1947 through 1994—the
United States and other nations navigated a trading system
that was part rules of conduct, part sovereigntist power politics.
Although there was a dispute resolution system within GATT, it
was not accompanied by any credible enforcement mechanism,
and states would often decide not to comply with adverse rulings
handed down by panels. 100 For instance, in the state-to-state
dispute resolution process, if a decision of the panel was too
burdensome in political terms for the losing party to comply
with, that government would simply block the GATT panel
decision, and ignore it. 101 If a GATT nation was willing to
endure criticism and international political pressure, there was
See WTO: 2012 Press Release, WTO Membership Rises to 157 With the
Entry of Russia and Vanuatu, WORLD TRADE ORG., (Aug. 22, 2012),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr671_e.htm (noting Russia’s
2012 entry into the WTO).
99 See Bryce Covert, Trump’s Terrible Deals, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/144273/trumps-terrible-deals (reviewing deals
Trump has made with manufacturers so far and highlighting cost to
government, based on tax benefits, per theoretical job, and fact that few
factories are guaranteed or have been built yet).
100 See Petko D. Kantchevski, The Difference Between the Panel Procedures of
the GATT and the WTO: The Role of GATT and WTO Panels In Trade
Dispute Settlement, 3 B.Y.U. INT’L. L. & MGMT. REV. 79, 80-91 (2006)
(discussing the nature of the old GATT panel system and the innovations
brought into trade law dispute resolution).
101 There are many such examples, including the Tuna-Dolphin dispute. See,
e.g., WTO: Environment: Disputes 4, Mexico etc vs US: ‘tuna-dolphin’, WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm
(noting that “the panel report was never adopted even though some of the
‘intermediary’ countries pressed for its adoption”).
98
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no particular “real world” price to be paid for ignoring the
ruling.
The “Uruguay Round” period, from 1986-1994, roughly
coincided with the EU’s “Single Market” negotiations, a time of
hope and confidence in the expansion of free trade and the
enforceable legal rules to go with it. Nothing less than true (thus
coercive) enforceability would suffice, it was believed at the
time. International characters like Peter Sutherland were
busily expounding on the bountiful effects of free trade and the
evils of protectionism. 102 The willingness of national
governments to cooperate with this massive project of
judicializing trade rules can be put down to the lobbying of
corporate interests, the determination of multinational
companies to enforce neoliberal economics and unlimited access
to cheaper and less regulated sites for investment. 103 The
assumption was that international capital could continue its
ever-outward expansion, and that the wisdom of this
overarching policy would manifest itself, although not much
attention was given to what the measurements of success would
be.
For better or worse, the WTO, along with NAFTA and the
Single Market program in Europe, worked as intended.
Economic integration accelerated, and the mobility of the
multinational corporation was enhanced. There were few if any
labor-based protections enacted to deal with the “losers” in
international trade—and it was always acknowledged, even by
the greatest cheer- leaders of free trade, that there would be

See Charles Pretzlik, View From the Top: Peter Sutherland, Chairman of
BP,
FIN.
TIMES
(Dec.
14,
2007),
http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2007/12/14/financial-times-view-from-the-toppeter-sutherland-chairman-of-bp/ (noting that “Peter Sutherand…is
described by some as the father of globalisation. He ran the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and became the head of its successor body,
the World Trade Organization.”). Sutherland is notorious for his proglobalist advocacy.
103 See, e.g., Bernhard Zangl, Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of
Dispute Settlement Under GATT and the WTO, 52 INT’L. STUD. Q. 825 (2008)
(comparing dispute resolution models and interests that influenced them);
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global
Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 9 (analyzing the agendas at
work in the operation of the WTO’s dispute resolution system); Helena Paul
& Ricarda Steinbrecher, Corporate Influence on International Regulatory
Bodies, in HUNGRY CORPORATIONS: TRANSNATIONAL BIOTECH COMPANIES
COLONISE
THE
FOOD
CHAIN,
ECONEXUS
(Nov.
2003),
http://www.econexus.info/publication/hungry-corporations (discussing corporate
influence over the creation of the WTO).
102
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“winners” and “losers.”104 Commentators usually said that the
“losers” from free trade could be compensated by mechanisms
created by national governments; the international system itself
did not have to be concerned with this aspect of free trade. The
logic of the newly enforceable rules—rules that had to be taken
seriously—was that there were clear effects on labor markets,
product supply chains and investment decisions.105 This broad
transformation did not occur overnight, but as a process of
accretion. Free trade became entrenched in the minds of
corporate decision-makers and left its mark on all aspects of the
buying and selling of goods and services.106 The time period from
1995 to the present is long in global economic terms. As with
Brexit, one does not wave a wand and undo that much evolution
without a great deal of disruption.107
It is clear that the Trump campaign focused on the most
traumatic symbol of the free trade drama: the devastated
community when the local factory shuts down, its parts sold off,
and moves away to China, Mexico, Vietnam or some other lower
cost jurisdiction.108 He channeled the resentment and confusion
caused by those key events, painfully alive in the memories of
many Americans, and articulated a sense of angry resistance.
Whereas the so-called “elites” talked the language of economic
See Dani Rodrik, Too Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers, PROJECT
SYNDICATE
(Apr.
11,
2017),
https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/free-trade-losers-compensation-too-late-by-danirodrik-2017-04?barrier=accessreg (analyzing the “free trade winners and
losers” issue).
105 See, e.g., Yunling Zhang, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on
Business Activity: A Survey of Firms in the People’s Republic of China, ASIAN
DEV.
BANK
INST.
(Oct.
2010),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156106/adbi-wp251.pdf
106 See How Businesses Use FTAs, AUSTL. GOV’T.: DEPT. FOREIGN AFF. &
TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/how-to-use-ftas.aspx (last
visited Aug. 23, 2017) (listing the variety of ways free trade agreements
influence corporate decision-making).
107 See A Textbook Lesson on Disruption: The Game-changing Brexit
Referendum,
DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/audit/articles/flip-side-brexitdisruption.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2017) (describing how businesses can be
completely surprised by geo-political changes like Brexit, having to alter
strategies they believed to be fixed and certain).
108 See David Jackson, Donald Trump Targets Globalization and Free Trade
as
Job-killers,
USA
TODAY
(June
28,
2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/06/28/donaldtrump-globalization-trade-pennsylvania-ohio/86431376/
(summarizing
Trump’s campaign speech in Pennsylvania and his focus on free trade,
claiming globalization has left workers with nothing but “poverty and
heartache” and made elites wealthier).
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rationalism, orderly acceptance of this kind of natural evolution,
Trump raged against the outsourcing phenomenon.109 However,
his actual plans for ameliorating the outsourcing phenomenon
itself remained extremely unclear, perhaps purposely so. 110 In
the American heartland, factories had been closing and moving
away for well over twenty years; could this be fixed now, and
could it be stopped abruptly? As explained above, while Trump
occasionally criticized American corporations, his loudest wrath
was reserved for the governments of China and Mexico, whom
he accused of treating the US badly, under the terms of “bad
deals” that successive American governments had allegedly
allowed to be signed.111
It is certainly possible for any national government to
respond with determination to outsourcing, even taking into
account debates over the labor market effects of automation
(unrelated to outsourcing) and the open question of whether the
jobs leaving the US can be profitably performed in the US
anymore. 112 But in order not to jeopardize the peace and
stability dimension of free global trade, such a change should
See Clarence Page, Economic Anxiety Fuels the GOP’s New “Trumpism”,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE
(Mar.
25,
2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/page/ct-donald-trump-workingclass-page-perspec-0327-jm-20160325-story.html; see also Jeffrey Rothfeder,
Why Donald Trump Is Wrong About Manufacturing Jobs and China, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/whydonald-trump-is-wrong-about-manufacturing-jobs-and-china (arguing that
the great slide of US jobs to China has slowed and is now reversing, as firms
return manufacturing jobs to the US, a process known as onshoring).
110 See Donald Trump Warns US Companies Will Face ‘Consequences’ For
Outsourcing
Jobs
Overseas,
ABC
NEWS
(Dec.
1,
2016),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-02/trump-warns-of-consequences-for-uscompanies-sending-jobs-abroad/8086536.
111 See, e.g., Grace Donnelly, As Donald Trump Flirts with Trade Wars, These
Are
the
Deals
to
Watch,
FORTUNE
(Feb.
28,
2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/02/28/trump-trade-nafta-china-eu/; Don Lee, Trump
Wants to Cut Bilateral Trade Deals, But What If Nobody Comes to the Table?,
LA TIMES (May 26, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-tradestrategy-20170526-story.html (indicating that Trump believed he could
replace multilateral trade agreements with supposedly preferable bilateral
deals, though few other nations seemed interested in that prospect);
Needham, supra note 71; see also Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump),
TWITTER
(Mar.
5,
2018,
3:47
AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/970626966004162560?lang=en.
112 See Alex Lach, 5 Facts About Overseas Outsourcing: Trend Continues to
Grow as American Workers Suffer, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (July 9, 2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/07/09/11898/5facts-about-overseas-outsourcing/ (outlining the scope and scale of the
outsourcing problem in America).
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certainly not be brought about piecemeal or abruptly. That prounion progressives did not long ago establish a legislatively
based message on the outsourcing issue is striking. 113 As the
political events of 2015-2016 demonstrated, silence in the face of
the factory closure “drama” is extremely dangerous. 114 The
mobility of manufacturing was not simply an annoying
sideshow, bound to right itself in the end. It has long been an
open wound, causing fear and pain across swaths of the United
States since global trade rules made this logically inevitable.
So what might genuinely effective legislation contain?
The objective would have to be to slow the outflow of
manufacturing jobs, while not causing disruption and panic
across the national and global economies. In that sense, there
are really two main devices possible: first, tax or other financial
incentives
and
disincentives
regarding
factory
closure/outsourcing, and second, legally enhanced labor
protections, perhaps in the form of mandatory involvement of
labor in decision-making on factory location.115 The first would
But see Nadia Prupis, Cornering Trump on Jobs, Sanders Announces AntiOutsourcing
Bill,
COMMON
DREAMS
(Nov.
29,
2016),
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/11/28/cornering-trump-jobssanders-announces-anti-outsourcing-bill
(reporting
Bernie
Sanders’s
introduction of legislation, aptly named the Outsourcing Prevention Act,
aimed at keeping jobs in the US, in particular by placing a special tax on
profits earned through US companies as a result of their outsourcing of jobs,
and denying US loans and other benefits to companies engaged in
outsourcing). Senator Sanders compared his own proposed legislation to the
approach being taken by President Trump, which was reliant on exhortation
and promises of tax breaks, rather than firm legislatively-imposed conditions.
See Bernie Sanders, Carrier Just Showed Corporations How to Beat Donald
Trump,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
1,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/01/berniesanders-carrier-just-showed-corporations-how-to-beat-donaldtrump/?utm_term=.165c3e0b4510.
114 See Annie Karni, Clinton Rolls Out a New Message for Sanders—and
Trump,
POLITICO
(Mar.
4,
2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/hillary-clinton-speech-message-berniesanders-donald-trump-220287 (reporting on Clinton’s attempt to put forward
a new message on the issue of trade and job losses, but that the message
tended to be lost in the pressure coming from both Donald Trump and Bernie
Sanders, each demanding a more strident approach to the problem).
115 See Annie Ropeik, Flanked by Workers, Sen. Donnelly Previews AntiOutsourcing Bill, NPR (Jan. 13, 2017), http://wbaa.org/post/flanked-workerssen-donnelly-previews-anti-outsourcing-bill#stream/0 (reporting legislation
that has been introduced so far focuses on penalties for firms that choose to
outsource jobs). Proposed legislation does not, however, provide workers the
right to be involved in decision-making. It is also important to note that
Trump has not expressed support for the draft legislation making the rounds,
and instead has focused on blaming other countries, and—to the extent that
113
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help to offset the obvious economic incentives created by NAFTA
and the WTO, leading large corporations to move their
production facilities to places of abundant cheap labor and lax
environmental regulation. Such tax or financial counter
measures would also have to be to some degree coercive: moving
a factory out of the US, without finding alternative jobs for
displaced workers, would lead to some form of a fine, imposed by
the nation on behalf of workers.
The other approach would be to directly grant workers
legal rights to weigh in on such decisions, and to make the
location of factories and the protection of jobs a central aspect of
their negotiations with management, even in the absence of a
union. 116 That is, management would no longer have an
unfettered, unilateral right to close and move factories, leaving
communities devastated. For those who consider such legal
innovations to be “unrealistic,” the only response is that we will
then have to live with the existing situation. We cannot have it
both ways. Undoing 25 years or more of free trade rules has
other, and far more serious, negative effects in the form of trade
wars and global political instability.
The contrast between the approach taken by Candidate
Trump during the presidential campaign and a robust
legislative scheme designed to alter corporate behavior is stark.
The former approach places the strongman in the position of
“making deals” with foreign governments and US corporations,
although it was never explained what the content of those deals
would be.117 It is also not clear, in a world where trade rules
have eliminated barriers to the free movement of goods, what
he blames corporations—states that he will put special tariffs on products
coming from factories that have been on the receiving end of outsourcing. In
fact, Democrats in Congress have tried for years to pass anti-outsourcing
legislation. See Lori Montgomery, Anti-outsourcing Bill Fails in Senate,
WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/28/AR2010092806143.html (noting that a solid
bloc of Republicans, four Democrats, and Joe Lieberman, voted against the
bill).
116 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Offshore Outsourcing and Worker Rights, 48:3
L.
QUADRANGLE
69
(2006),
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1698&context=art
icles (observing the lack of worker protection in the outsourcing context and
noting that unions have little control over decisions by corporations to
outsource jobs).
117 See Ben Casselman, Why Trump’s Carrier Deal Isn’t the Way to Save US
Jobs,
In
Real
Terms,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-trumps-carrier-deal-isnt-the-way-tosave-u-s-jobs/.
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exactly would stop the flow of goods, and thus the continued
relocation of factories to other countries. It was not an act of
“China” that led US firms to move to China. It was the operation
of global trade rules fostered, supported and accepted by the US,
as well as most other trading nations.118 While angry rhetoric
might be appealing to the audience at a political rally, it is
highly misleading as to cause and effect.119 Trump’s continued
threat to unilaterally impose high tariffs on certain goods would
lead inevitably to retaliation by other nations.120
In its time, the 1990s free trade “dream” was not an
entirely unworthy one. It was certainly manipulated by
corporate interests, and the general public was hardly consulted
as to issues of global “job sharing” and the real effects of creative
destruction in the economy. Nevertheless, the other, positive
side of the free trade equation concerned an integrated world,
with fewer violent conflicts and more equitably distributed
development. The logic of NAFTA, the WTO and other regional
agreements guaranteed that corporations would be freed from
any geographical loyalty, and many workers would be left to
fend for themselves. Whether that could have been foreseen or
not (and I believe that it could have been), the fact that most
mainstream politicians have still failed to confront free trade’s
discontents as late as 2016 is difficult to comprehend. And
despite the fulminations of Candidate Trump, it is doubtful that
this type of “populist” would have the knowledge, skill or will to
confront and attempt to address the many problems left behind
in the free trade wake. It is worth noting that at the time of this
writing, the Democratic Party, gearing up for the 2018 mid-term
elections, have released a policy on free trade agreements as
See Jeff Faux, NAFTA’s Impact on U.S. Workers, Econ. Policy Inst. (Dec. 9,
2013), http://www.epi.org/blog/naftas-impact-workers/ (describing four ways
NAFTA affected U.S.). Faux explains that as a result of NAFTA: 1) 700,000
American jobs were lost to Mexico; 2) U.S. workers were forced to accept
lower wages; 3) Mexican farmers and their families migrated north and
entered the U.S. labor market, often illegally; 4) rules for a global economy
were established that benefited capital and labor costs. See id.
119 In the EU, the so-called “Acquired Rights” Directive (Transfer of
Undertakings) does offer some protection to employees affected by
outsourcing of jobs. See Charles Wynn-Evans, Does TUPE Apply to
Offshoring?,
EMPL.
L.J.,
(Mar.
2008),
https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/publication/2008/3/does-tupe-apply-tooffshoring.html.
120 See Patrick Gillespie, Mexico Warns Trump on Tariffs:
We’ll Respond
‘Immediately’,
CNNMONEY
(Jan.
14,
2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/14/news/economy/donald-trump-mexico-tariffsresponse/index.html.
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part of their new “better deal” strategy. It remains to be seen
whether it will meet the challenge of better protecting workers
while preserving the geopolitical gains derived from modern
trade relations.121
It seems that, with the rejection of the TPP and TTIP, and
the discrediting of the WTO by the new US administration, we
may have left behind one phase of the postwar multilateral
ideal, and returned to a more sovereigntist, bilaterally focused
age.122 While Brexit has been accepted as a reality, we do not
know, and will not know for several years, whether and in what
manner Brexit will “happen.”123 Middle class and working class
voters may have the impression that they have pushed back
against the “global elites,” but it is doubtful that the plutocrats
and oligarchs of our time are that easily vanquished.124
VIII. WHAT NEW AND BETTER “DEALS” SO FAR?
Since the possibility of rejecting standard free trade policy
came to light in a major way during the 2015-2016 presidential
campaign, it is worth considering what steps have been taken,
or threatened, by the Trump administration on the subject of
international trade rules since January 2017. International
See David Weigel, Senate Democrats Unveil ‘Better Deal’ on Trade with
new Restrictions on Outsourcing and Foreign Deals, Wash. Post (Aug. 2,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/08/02/senatedemocrats-unveil-better-deal-on-trade-with-new-restrictions-on-outsourcingand-foreign-deals/?utm_term=.402025151770
(summarizing
key
trade
components of Democrats “Better Deal” agenda). The Democrats new trade
outline includes seven core ideas, including a new “independent trade
prosecutor” to supplement to the work of the U.S. Trade Representative, the
creation of an “American Jobs Council” with the authority to block foreign
investment that would cost U.S. jobs, and considering a federal contractors
record on outsourcing before awarding them a federal contract. See id.
122 See Nicky Woolf, Justin McCurry & Benjamin Haas, Trump to Withdraw
From Trans-Pacific Partnership on First Day in Office, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/donald-trump-100days-plans-video-trans-pacific-partnership-withdraw (noting that Trump
would turn his attention to bilateral trade agreements in the future).
123 See Silvia Amaro, Soros Suggests that Brexit Might Never Actually
Happen, CNBC (June 1, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/01/sorossuggests-that-brexit-might-never-actually-happen.html
(suggesting
that
political developments might make continued membership in the EU
desirable for Britain).
124 See Peter Pham, Wealth Inequality Boosts Power of Oligarchs, FORBES
(Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterpham/2015/12/04/oligarchsplutocrats-and-technocrats-oh-my/#7237e2bf45e6 (noting that power and
wealth are now extraordinarily concentrated in a few hands).
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trade is a shared responsibility and competence of the executive
and legislative branches of government under the US
Constitution; the president is not unfettered in how he can
respond to what he considers to be “unfair” trade deals based on
international agreements previously entered into by the United
States.125 The American President unquestionably has a great
deal of discretion in the realm of foreign affairs, but the
Constitution specifically grants Congress competence in the
management of commercial relations with foreign nations. 126
Over time, Congress has delegated a great deal of power to the
President to negotiate free trade agreements, with Congress
generally having cast an up or down vote under the so-called
“fast track” process.127 While Congress sets tariffs, the President
has been granted the statutory authority to raise tariffs in times
of economic or political emergency, including threats to national
security.128 What is more, the major free trade agreements of the
1990s were adopted by the United States in the form of federal
statutes—thus creating a greater role for Congress than would
be the case if these had been put through the Article III treaty
ratification process.129
In this regard, Trump’s first threat was that he would
begin to slap 35% tariffs on products entering the United States,
in situations where the product had previously been

See George Will, Congress, Not the President, Should Raise Tariffs, WASH.
POST WRITERS GROUP (Feb. 16, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5538138
(noting Congress’s constitutional role in setting tariff rates, but also statutory
delegation of such powers to the President under certain conditions).
126 See Jonathan Masters, US Foreign Policy Powers:
Congress and the
President,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(Mar.
2,
2017),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-andpresident.
127 See Caitlain Devereaux Lewis, Presidential Authority Over Trade:
Imposing Tariffs and Duties, CONG. RES. SERV. (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44707.pdf.
128 See infra note 136 and accompanying text (citing and discussing statute
providing President authority to raise tariffs in emergency situations).
129 See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799, 801 (1995) (pointing out that both NAFTA and the WTO
Agreements were not ratified through a process of advice and consent by the
U.S. Senate, but rather as “congressional-executive” agreements, brought
into force in the US through simple majority votes of both houses of
Congress). In this seminal article on the constitutionality of NAFTA, the
authors question the constitutionality of this method of adopting
international agreements.
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manufactured in a United States facility.130 (More recently, he
has focused on placing tariffs on certain selected products under
a national security rationale, which would have more targeted,
and thus limited, implications.131) Whether the president enjoys
the power to walk the US back from treaty obligations in the
trade realm is a difficult question. 132 To the extent that both
NAFTA and the WTO agreements were entered into via federal
statutes and not the usual treaty ratification process, as
mentioned above, it is especially uncertain as to whether Trump
has such unilateral powers.133
It seems likely that Trump was quickly informed that if
he were to slap tariffs on products coming to the US from
abroad, without any rationale that would hold up under WTO
law, the US would soon find itself and its products treated in a
similar manner. 134 Not only would this potentially lead to an
unraveling of international trade relations and a rapid eruption
of trade wars, US exporters and US workers would experience
economic shock.135 Again, while this sounded appealing to some
during the campaign season, the very idea of imposing large,
legally unjustified tariffs on imported goods could not be
sustained. It is worth noting that this particular threat seems to
have disappeared from Trump’s most recent political discourse.
Again, the newer rationale seems to be based on a relatively
See Mahita Gajanan, Donald Trump Warns of 35% Tariff for Companies
that
Move
Abroad,
FORTUNE
(Dec.
4,
2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/12/04/donald-trump-tariff-company-regulations/.
131 See Alan Rappeport, US Trade Partners Watch Warily as Trump
Considers
Steel
Tariffs,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/us/politics/trump-steel-tariff.html.
132 See Matt Ford, How Easily Could Trump Withdraw the US from NAFTA,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
26,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/trump-naftawithdrawal-order/524463/ (noting the difficulties raised by the fact that
NAFTA was adopted by the US in the form of a federal statute, leaving it
unclear whether the President could, without the agreement of Congress,
withdraw from the agreement).
133 See id.
134 See Nick Carey & Ginger Gibson, Trump’s Tough Talk Makes U.S. Firms
Fear
China
Retribution,
REUTERS
(Dec.
12,
2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-companiesidUSKBN1412Q7.
135 See David Nakamura, The Effect of Trump’s Trade Policies? Trade Wars
with China, Mexico that Could Cost US 4 million Jobs, Report Says, WASH.
POST
(Sept.
19,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/09/19/the-effect-of-trumps-trade-policies-trade-wars-withchina-mexico-that-could-cost-u-s-4-million-jobs-reportsays/?utm_term=.12fe1429893f (writing that Trump’s trade policies could
overturn many years of rules-based international trade relationships).
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obscure statute that allows the president to take action to
reduce imports when national security is at stake.136
Instead of taking on free trade agreements wholesale, or
with the intention to rewrite them root and branch, it seems
that the Trump administration will instead focus on discrete,
symbolic issues, acting in a somewhat more unilateral fashion,
but without the broad-brushed audacity promised on the
campaign trail. For instance, the Trump USTR has moved
against Canadian lumber and foreign steel, in particular from
China, but without suggesting that these actions are prelude to
broader trade wars.137 As of this writing, the situation is fluid
and uncertain. US trade and political allies appear to be
working together on trade agreements while excluding the US,
the effects of which will not be apparent for some time.138 Trump
occasionally raises the issue of unfair trade and his wish to
retaliate against countries behaving “unfairly”, but there is little
consistency with regard to his expressed intentions.139
Perhaps with an eye to political support in key states like
Pennsylvania, the Trump administration is investigating
whether steel imports constitute a threat to “national
security.”140 It may seem safer to the administration to rely on
this rarely-used provision of law, under a rationale of national
security as a basis for imposing tariffs on steel imported from
See Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §§ 201, 231, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1862,
1864 (2012) (allowing the President to impose import restrictions when such
restriction is deemed necessary to promote national security). The Trade
Expansion Act was passed in 1962 in an effort to stimulate the U.S. economy
and to prevent “Communist economic penetration.” Id. at § 1801; see also
Shawn Donnan, Donald Trump Moves Towards Imposing Tariffs on Steel
Imports, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d8413fe825e6-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16?mhq5j=e2 (noting that Trump’s rationale will
be a 1962 law that allows for the imposition of tariffs on foreign products
when the imports in question “threaten American security readiness”).
137 See Ian Austen & Peter Baker, Lumber Tariff Adds Wrinkle to NAFTA
Talks
with
Canada,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
25,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/business/trump-trudeau-canada-tradelumber-dairy.html (making the point that the U.S. government is now using
such language as, “NAFTA has not worked as well as it should,” rather than
the wholesale denunciations that became familiar during the campaign).
138 See, e.g., Eur. Comm’n Press Release, EU and Japan Reach Agreement in
Principle on Economic Partnership Agreement (July 6, 2017) (announcing
that the EU and Japan agreed to enter into a trade partnership).
139 See Nouriel Roubini, Opinion:
6 Reasons Trump’s Erratic, Destructive
Policies Could Tank the Markets, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/6-reasons-trumps-erratic-destructivepolicies-could-tank-the-markets-2017-02-02.
140 See Donnan, supra note 136.
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China.141 Although China is not a major supplier of steel to the
US, this seems to be a kind of trial balloon, launched to show
some force behind Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric, and to shore up
support in the Trump heartland. Although the administration
made headlines in April 2017 by placing tariffs on Canadian
lumber, this was in the context of a more conventional antisubsidies rationale, which by its nature does not threaten the
foundation of international trade relations.142 Besides the more
or less unsurprising nature of the rationale for this action, it
should also be noted that the US and Canada have argued about
trade in lumber products for decades. 143 The real question
outstanding is whether Trump will follow through in taking
action of a kind designed to more clearly subvert what has been
the common understanding of global trade rules and
relationships since World War II, and certainly since 1995. 144

See Jacob M. Schlesinger & William Mauldin, Trump to Revive 1962 Law
to Explore New Barriers on Steel Imports, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-to-revive-1962-law-to-explore-newbarriers-on-steel-imports-1492661339 (describing Trump’s intended reliance
on the Trade Expansion Act).
142 See Frances Coppola, President’s Trump’s Tariff on Canadian Softwood
Lumber Imports Will Hurt America Most, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/04/25/president-trumpstariff-on-canadian-softwood-lumber-imports-will-hurt-americamost/#44034d322232 (assuming the Trump administration’s imposition of a
20% tariff on Canadian softwood lumber was spurred by complaints from
American lumber producers, “who have long complained that Canada’s
system of ‘stumpage’ (charges for logging on Canada’s government-owned
lands) amounts to an unfair subsidy.”).
143 See Drew Hasselback, Softwood Lumber Dispute Rears Its Head Again as
U.S. Prepares to Levy Tariffs, FIN. POST (Apr. 24, 2017),
http://business.financialpost.com/news/softwood-lumber-dispute-rears-itshead-again-as-u-s-prepares-to-levy-tariffs-of-up-to-40/wcm/c8743d94-a0fb41e2-90ea-e2ac108d4bcf (making clear that the US and Canada have argued
about trade practices in lumber products for many years).
144 See Shawn Donnan, Donald Trump Revives Threat to Pull US Out of
Nafta, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/cfdcec24-87c211e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 (reporting Trump stated at recent campaign rally,
held three years before next election, that he does not believe a deal will be
reached by officials currently renegotiating NAFTA, and that U.S. will likely
terminate the agreement). Republicans in Congress, however, appear to be
distancing themselves from Trump’s anti-trade position. See As Legislative
Deadlines Loom, Trump Creates Rifts with GOP Leaders, CBS NEWS (Aug.
25, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-attacks-gop-lawmakerstwitter-creates-rifts-ahead-of-deadlines/ (reporting Congress has twelve
working days in September to resolve rifts between itself and the President
that may cause government shutdown). Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell also questioned Trump’s anti-free trade position, saying “the
141
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What will ensue if he does take more radical and unilateral
action is completely unknown at this time.
Finally, as of this writing, the current USTR has just held
public hearings with a view to “modernizing” and renegotiating
the NAFTA Agreement.145 While the implications of this process
are potentially profound, it is more likely that there will be
tweaks to the system, including the removal of a special NAFTA
panel process to consider disagreements relating to dumping
and subsidies. In other words, it is likely that the Trump
administration will attempt to make it easier for the parties to
the agreement to impose protective measures under an antidumping rationale. While far from “pro-free-trade,” such a
change is also far from radically nationalistic; importantly, it
leaves in place the very thing Trump said he and he alone could
deal with: the freedom of U.S. companies to move factories to
Mexico, with consequent loss of American jobs. 146 It seems
increasingly unlikely that any political regime in the United
States will deal comprehensively with the interaction of “trade
and labor,” including of course the apparently inevitable loss of
American jobs. Even some of the strongest critics of the free
trade system and its effects on American jobs support robust
assistance to displaced workers, as opposed to a return to
protectionism.147 However, just as public awareness of the free
trade issue underwent dramatic change over the past two years,
it is not inconceivable that the global public will make greater
demands on the world trading system, leading to enhanced
emphasis on labor rights and job security.148 All we can say for

assumption that every free-trade agreement is a loser for America is largely
untrue.” See id.
145 See Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Public Hearings on the
Renegotiation of NAFTA (June 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2017/june/public-hearing-naftarenegotiation.
146 See President Trump Tells CEOs He’s Going to Bring Millions of Jobs Back
to America, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/23/donaldtrump-jobs-america-ceos/.
147 See Autor, supra note 26, at 2156-59 (observing ability of government
benefit programs to mitigate negative effects of loss of manufacturing jobs);
see also David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock:
Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN.
REV. ECON., 2016, at 205, 229-31 (observing responsiveness of transfer
payments to import exposure, but also the limited “redistribution of trade
gains from winners to losers”).
148 See generally Paulette L. Stenzel, The Pursuit of Equilibrium as the Eagle
Meets the Condor: Supporting Sustainable Development Through Fair Trade,
49 AM. BUS. L.J. 557, 559 (arguing that the public in various countries have
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sure is that “free trade” and trade agreements will likely remain
at the center of political debate for a long time to come.
IX.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Many themes in international law and domestic politics
come together in the Trump “free trade” story. On the one hand,
writers and commentators on the burgeoning structures of
global free trade failed to address the severe problem of job loss,
factory closure and cultural dislocation. The alienation caused at
least in part through the rigors of contemporary free trade
agreements is real, and the silence of the “elites” opened them to
the valid charge that they were indifferent to the economic and
social suffering of the former manufacturing class. Even during
the emotionally charged political season of 2015-2016,
mainstream politicians and the media did not perceive the
potency of this issue and the depth of popular resentment ripe
for manipulation.
As this article has stressed, there are at least two distinct
aspects to international free trade: one is the ostensible—
though often questionable—argument that free trade raises all
boats, leads to prosperity through exchange of goods, etc; the
other is that integrated economies lead to more global stability
and peace. While calling out the modern system of free trade,
Trump managed to expose a contradiction at the heart of this
modern paradigm, and yet undercut US leadership to the extent
that much of this leadership has been trade based.
More strikingly, the Trump critique, while tapping into
anger and resentment of the supposedly forgotten working class,
misidentified the source of distress by blaming foreign
governments for all American woes, and set himself up as a kind
of deal-making savior, in a manner that also misrepresents how
free trade agreements are created and sustained. He did not
promise to promote federal laws that would penalize
corporations engaging in outsourcing. Instead, he presented
himself as capable of coercing private companies into employing
more Americans, and, as mentioned above, capable of making
“better deals”—something that has little to do with the actual
free trade conundrum.
It is completely possible that a future US government
could address the problems of job insecurity and social
dislocation that have been caused at least in part by global
become disillusioned with the operation of what we have known as “free
trade,” and that more emphasis on fair trade is now required).
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manufacturing mobility. This would require legislation
protective of worker rights—making it more difficult for
corporations to outsource and making it easier for workers to
find new jobs, especially comparable jobs with benefits and
reasonable middle-class wages. Blaming China, Germany and
Mexico, and railing against “bad deals”, is a form of
demagoguery that will solve nothing. I have argued in this
Article that failure to act will exacerbate already inflamed
feelings of resentment and victimization on the part of the
working class and former working class. However, reacting in
the wrong way—precipitating trade wars, selectively slapping
on high tariffs to protect certain industries in a disorganized
fashion, and whipping up animosity towards friendly
countries—all of these policies are profoundly dangerous. As of
this writing, we cannot be sure what the Trump administration
will do, beyond continuing to inveigh against “bad trade deals.”
We do not know how the issue of globalization and job loss will
play out in future political campaigns or voter behavior.
What is certain is that the failure to foresee the problems
caused by unfettered free trade, and the inability to make trade
work for ordinary people, has been a very serious failure, one
that now threatens the stability of the Western alliance itself.
With the rise of illiberal, anti-constitutional and corrupt forces
in a variety of hitherto solidly democratic countries, the issue of
labor rights and economic stability have presented themselves
as issues surprisingly easy to manipulate. Academic lawyers
have again shown a fatal tendency to overlook the social and
political dimension lurking within legal structures, in this case
in a very dramatic, even world-changing manner.

